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Abstract. Jim Weatherall has argued that Einstein’s hole argument is
based on a misleading use of mathematics. I argue on the contrary that
Weatherall demands an implausible restriction on how mathematics is
used. The hole argument, on the other hand, is in no new danger at all.
1. Introduction
Jim Weatherall (forthcoming) has argued that interpreters of general rel-
ativity may disregard Einstein’s ‘hole argument’, at least as it is presented
by Earman and Norton (1987). He begins with the following innocuous ob-
servation: when we say two descriptions of the world are equivalent, we
generally mean that they share some relevant structure. Moreover, the rel-
evant structure for many mathematical descriptions is natural and obvious,
and gets expressed as a canonical equivalence relation. This kind of thinking
is familiar from a certain category-theoretic perspective, but since it may be
unfamiliar for the newcomer to this perspective, let me briefly summarise
this way of thinking.
Recall that the concepts of set theory are defined using just one special
relation, the membership relation ǫ. If two sets have the same membership
relations, then this expresses a sense in which they are isomorphic. The
isomorphism is established by exhibiting a mapping between two sets that
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preserves exactly the membership relations1, and in particular two sets have
exactly the same membership relations if and only if there is a bijection
between them. For this reason, when describing situations in which all and
only set membership relations matter, it is common to say two descriptions
are equivalent if and only if the sets are related by a bijection.
A similar perspective is available for Lorentzian manifolds (M,gab), which
characterise typical models of general relativity. The facts about Lorentzian
manifolds are expressed using a smooth manifoldM and a Lorentz-signature
metric gab. Since these include both smoothness and metrical relations, the
natural choice of morphism is a map that preserves exactly these relations;
such maps are called isometries. So, when we describe situations in which all
and only the smoothness and metrical relations matter, isometries provide
a natural standard of equivalence. Weatherall observes that when consider-
ing whether two descriptions are equivalent, it is important to identify the
structures with respect to which equivalence is defined.
I agree. But Weatherall goes on to assert that in any legitimate math-
ematical representation, one must presume that mathematical structures
represent a given physical scenario “equally well, for all purposes” if and
only if they are isomorphic, where the standard of isomorphism is the one
that is “given” by the standard formulation of a theory. I would like to
point out that if Weatherall’s dictum were strictly enforced, then it would
be a crippling limitation on mathematical modelling. It would prohibit the
human activity of freely choosing how mathematical language represents
the world. And it would mean that the only legitimate way to have a good
mathematical representation of is to have one that is an absolutely complete
description of the world. On the contrary, even our best mathematical mod-
els in physics are invariably incomplete, and so typically fail to distinguish
between distinct physical situations. Thus, for even our best mathematical
models, Weatherall’s dictum can dramatically fail.
1The morphisms of the category of sets are just the functions, since if f : A → B is a
function of sets, then a ∈ A only if f(a) ∈ f(A). The morphisms that preserve all and
only the membership relations are the bijections.
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2. Regarding the Hole Argument
2.1. Review of Earman and Norton. A Lorentzian manifold is a pair
(M,gab), where M is a smooth manifold and gab is a Lorentz-signature met-
ric. The natural symmetries in this category are the isometries, which pre-
serve the structure of bothM and gab: we say that (M,gab) and (M˜ , g˜ab) are
isometric (and ψ is an isometry) if and only if there exists a diffeomorphism
ψ : M → M˜ such that the pushforward of ψ preserves metrical relations, in
that ψ∗gab = g˜ab.
In general relativity we use Lorentzian manifolds to represent certain as-
pects of space and time. Often that representation involves interpreting
some part of that manifold as representing a region of physical spacetime,
such as a set of points containing the orbit of Mercury. But there is a fur-
ther interpretive view that was advocated by Newton, called substantivalism,
which holds that spacetime refers to a substantial entity that exists indepen-
dently of the matter it contains. How might one understand this statement
in the language of general relativity? Earman and Norton formulate it as the
view that “the manifold is identified as spacetime and it is argued that we
should hold a realist view of it”, identifying Michael Friedman (1983) as an
endorser of the view2 (Earman and Norton 1987, p.519). In particular they
propose to evaluate any formulation of substantivalism that would deny that
two isometric Lorentzian manifolds (M,gab) and (M˜, g˜ab) always represent
the same physical situation. They called this latter statement Leibniz Equiv-
alence; thus, the manifold substantivalism at issue for Earman and Norton’s
hole argument is characterised by the denial of Leibniz Equivalence.
Manifold substantivalism is of historical interest because Einstein himself
grappled with a version of it as he was coming to formulate general relativity,
inventing what Earman and Norton called the Hole Argument. To highlight
its modern philosophical significance, Earman and Norton formulate the
argument as follows: let (M,gab) be a Lorentzian manifold with a Cauchy
surface3 S and a time orientation. Consider an open region U to the timelike
future of S, sometimes called the hole region. Finally, let ψ : M → M
2This perspective on substantivalism was also articulated in papers by Earman (1970),
Earman and Friedman (1973) and Sklar (1974).
3A Cauchy surface for a Lorentzian manifold (M, gab) is a spacelike hypersurface that
is intersected by every inextendible timelike or null curve exactly once. Not all Lorentzian
manifolds admit a Cauchy surface, but we can always restrict attention to a subregion
N ⊆M such that (N, gab|N)) is a Lorentzian manifold that does admit a Cauchy surface.
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be any diffeomorphism that is not the identity inside U , but which is the
identity everywhere else, in such a way that the Leibniz equivalence-denier
will assert that (M,gab) and (M,ψ
∗gab) represent two physically distinct
situations (Figure 1). If one takes (M,gab) and (M,ψ
∗gab) to represent the
same physical situation on the surface S, but different physical situations to
the future of S, then this would be an example of indeterminism in general
relativity. Thus, Earman and Norton argued, by denying Leibniz equivalence
one pays the high price of introducing radical indeterminism4.
Figure 1.
(M,gab)
S
U
(M,ψ∗gab)
ψ(S)
ψ(U)
ψ
2.2. Disregarding the hole argument. Weatherall’s response to the hole
argument hinges on a declaration about how Lorentzian manifolds represent
the physical world. If two Lorentzian manifolds (M,gab) and (M, g˜ab) are
related by an isometry ψ, then according to Weatherall,
“for any region R of spacetime that may be adequately rep-
resented by some region U of (M,gab), there is a corre-
sponding region U˜ = ψ[U ] of (M, g˜ab) that can represent
the same region of spacetime equally well, for all purposes”
(p.11 Weatherall forthcoming, emphasis added).
Compare Weatherall’s expression to that of Earman and Norton:
“Leibniz Equivalence - Diffeomorphic models [i.e. isometric
spacetimes] represent the same physical situation” (Earman and Norton
1987, p.520).
These two statements are very nearly the same. An important exception is
Weatherall’s additional locution that isometric Lorentzian manifolds repre-
sent spacetime “equally well, for all purposes”. The only other distinction
that I can make out is his use of the modal “can”, and his consideration of
4Butterfield (1989) and Brighouse (1994) have argued that the indeterminism intro-
duced in this way may not be so “radical” after all.
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an open set U representing a region R, neither of which depart from Earman
and Norton’s statement in any interesting way.
However, whereas Earman and Norton take Leibniz equivalence to be an
interpretive postulate to be critically evaluated, Weatherall takes his dic-
tum to be an a priori requirement. In particular, he says that whether two
mathematical models represent the same physical situation is “given by the
mathematics used in formulating those models” (p.3), and in the particular
case of Lorentzian manifolds, “the fact that such an isometry exists pro-
vides the only sense in which the two spacetimes are empirically equivalent”
(p.12)5. To suggest otherwise would amount to “asserting that spacetime is
not or cannot be adequately represented by (precisely) a Lorentzian man-
ifold, at least for some purposes” (p.20), which Weatherall says cannot be
right. So, by suggesting an interpretation of general relativity that denies
this notion of equivalence, manifold substantivalism is dead in the water
before it sets sail.
Of course, Earman and Norton also reject manifold substantivalism: this
is just the hypothesis that is reduced to absurdity by the hole argument! But
Weatherall denies that it is even a legitimate reductio hypothesis to begin
with6, instead pillorying it as a “misleading use of the formalism of general
relativity” (p.1), as a failure to use the formalism “correctly, consistently,
and according to our best understanding of the mathematics” (p.3), that
it is not “mathematically natural or philosophically satisfying” (p.21). On
Weatherall’s view, the hole is blocked because its reductio hypothesis is
illegitimate.
Another way to understand these expressions of distaste is in terms of
a kind of quietism: manifold substantivalism is so breathtakingly pointless
that it is not even worth the time and energy it takes to utter. I feel the same
way a few days out of the week, and will discuss quietism in the final section
of this paper. But first, let me give a more critical take on the argument
that Weatherall has given.
5And again, in his discussion of Newtonian spacetimes: “the relevant standard of equiv-
alence is already manifest in the map that relates the structures in the first place” (p.18).
6Although Weatherall later claims his view “does not rule out (or even rule on) sub-
stantivalism or relationism” (p.20), the precise meaning of substantivalism that Earman
and Norton consider is the rejection of Leibniz equivalence, which evidently is ruled out
by Weatherall’s remarks, and so manifold substantivalism must be too.
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3. Exceptions to the given
3.1. Reservations about Weatherall’s argument. Weatherall has stated
an interesting view, but advertises that it renders the hole argument “blocked”
while remaining “essentially neutral on the metaphysics of space and time”
(p.2). I am not convinced. Let me begin by discussing some reservations
about the general perspective on applied mathematics that underpins his
view.
Weatherall claims that his perspective on isometric Lorentzian manifold
follows from a general perspective on how mathematics can represent the
world. In particular, Weatherall says he only assumes that “isomorphic
mathematical models in physics should be taken to have the same represen-
tational capacities” in the sense that,
“if a particular mathematical model may be used to represent
a physical situation, then any isomorphic model may be used
to represent that situation equally well” (p.4).
This expression seems innocuous: of course one can use two isomorphic
mathematical models to represent the same physical situation. But if we in-
terpret this expresssion strictly, then Weatherall has not in any way blocked
the hole argument. Weatherall’s argument requires the additional assump-
tion that one cannot do otherwise. In particular, he says his dictum prohibits
isometric Lorentzian manifolds from representing distinct physical situations
for any purpose whatsoever, not even to express manifold substantivalism for
the purposes of reductio. It is this presumption, that isometric Lorentzian
manifolds represent the same situation equally well “for all purposes”, which
is supposed to prohibit the (reductio) hypothesis that two isometric space-
times can ever represent different things. The violation of this prohibition
is supposed to render the hole argument misleading, unnatural and unsat-
isfying. Weatherall’s argument does not go through without it. So, since
Weatherall takes his critique to “follow” from the statement above, one can
only charitably assume that he implicitly means to say “for all purposes”
here too.
This presumption is not metaphysically neutral. On the contrary, it is a
severe restriction on what mathematics can represent. Moreover, counterex-
amples apparently abound. Any two single-element sets are isomorphic as
sets, in that there is a bijection between them. But this does not prevent
one from using one single-element set to represent a black raven, while us-
ing another to represent a white shoe. Of course one can use each of these
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two sets to represent the same thing (say, the raven). But nothing a priori
prevents one from using them to represent different things, and for some
purposes we may wish to. Another example, co-opted from van Fraassen:
two drawings of a dragon that are isomorphic as shapes in the Euclidean
plane can represent the same thing. But for some purposes (as van Fraassen
suggests), we might wish to take one to represent Margaret Thatcher as
draconian, while taking the other to represent a mythical beast.
The same applies to isometric Lorentzian manifolds. Of course they can
represent the same physical situation. But there is no reason to think that
they must do so “for all purposes”. In Einstein’s hole argument, one consid-
ers what would happen if isometric Lorentzian manifolds were to represent
different things, for the purpose of showing that a certain expression of sub-
stantivalism is absurd. Nothing a priori prevents us from doing so, and
Weatherall has given us no reason to believe otherwise.
I anticipate two sorts of rejoinders to my criticism. The first rejoinder is
to say that, when we chose to represent a black raven and a white shoe in
terms of single-element sets, we actually did identify them as the same. I
see no way of understanding this that doesn’t beg the question. I gave an
example in which (for some purpose) I used single-element sets to represent
different physical situations. What is wrong with that? If the answer is sim-
ply to insist that “single-element sets represent the same situation”, then
that is begging the question. The same applies to Weatherall’s discussion
of the hole argument: Einstein used isometric Lorentzian manifolds to rep-
resent different physical situations, for at least one purpose — the purpose
of discovering the implications of general relativity. What is wrong with
that? If the response is just to declare that isometric Lorentzian manifolds
represent the same physical situation “for all purposes”, then that is not
very informative.
The second rejoinder is to say that, since we think that in the real world a
black raven is different from a white shoe, we were implicitly using a different
mathematical structure, not single-element sets. Similarly, if someone really
thinks that isometric structures can represent different physical situations,
then those structures are not Lorentzian manifolds. But this response gives
up the game of Weatherall’s dictum: physical equivalence is not “given by
the mathematics” automatically, but is rather determined by what we think
about the real world, and by how we use mathematics. Once we accept
this kind view, it is less compelling to state that manifold substantivalism
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cannot even be formulated as a reductio hypothesis. Manifold substantival-
ists are just those who think isometric Lorentzian manifolds can represent
different physical situations. In fact, Weatherall considers a very similar
line of response in Section 5, concluding that “it is difficult to see how this
could be done in a mathematically natural or philosophically satisfying way”
(p.21). But if that is where we have ended up, then Earman and Norton’s
hole argument was never “blocked” after all. After all, they conclude a very
similar similar thing: manifold substantivalism is indeed unnatural and un-
satisfying, in the sense that it introduces a radical form of indeterminism
into general relativity.
Figure 2.
ψs
Here is another example, more concretely in the context of general rela-
tivity, to suggest that we should not be so quick to say that “the fact that
such an isometry exists provides the only sense in which the two spacetimes
are empirically equivalent” (Weatherall forthcoming, p.12). Let (M,ηab) be
the half-plane M = R × (0,∞) together with the Minkowski metric. Then
there is a semigroup of isometries ψs : R× (0,∞)→ R× (s,∞) that embed
(M,ηab) into a proper subset of itself, as illustrated in Figure 2. Weather-
all’s view appears to imply not only that these two Lorentzian manifolds
can represent the same physical situation, but that they do so “equally
well, for all purposes”, in spite of the fact that one is a proper part of the
other. It is the “for all purposes” part that seems to me to be too much.
It is perfectly coherent to distinguish what happens in an arbitrary region
in spacetime from what happens in a proper subregion, in spite of the fact
that the Lorentzian manifolds representing these regions are related by an
isometry. Of course for some purposes one can use both Lorentzian mani-
folds to represent the same situation. But we might also wish to treat them
as representing different physical situations, at least for some purposes. It
is in no way “unnatural” or “unsatisfying” to distinguish events that occur
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in a proper submanifold of (M,ηab) from those that occur in (M,ηab) more
generally.
I suspect that some readers may find my drilling of the “for all purposes”
locution confusing, when they compare this response to some passages in
Weatherall like the following.
On the view described there, once one asserts that spacetime
is represent by a Lorentzian manifold, one is committed to
taking isometric spacetimes to have the capacity to represent
the same physical situations, since isometry is the standard of
isomorphism given in the mathematical theory of Lorentzian
manifolds. To deny this would be in effect to insist that
it is some other structure — one that is not preserved by
isometries — that represents spacetime in relativity theory.
(Weatherall forthcoming, p.20)
Here again the “for all purposes” locution has been dropped. Other than
that, the passage describes options very similar to the two rejoinders I con-
sidered above. But I do not see how the argument can work without some-
thing like the addition of “for all purposes”. The hole argument does not
consider whether two isometric spacetimes merely have “the capacity” to
represent the same physical situation. The question is whether one can say
that there is some situation in which the manifold substantivalist will deny
that they are the same. Weatherall blocks the hole argument by rejecting
this statement, on grounds that isometric spacetimes “represent the same
region of spacetime equally well, for all purposes” (p.11) and that ”the fact
that such an isometry exists provides the only sense in which two spacetimes
are empirically equivalent” (p.12). This is the main argument, and it is this
that I have argued is implausible.
3.2. Alternative takes on representation. It is difficult to maintain that
equivalence in empirical science is somehow “given” by the mathematical
language we use to describe it, or that some standard of isomorphism is
the only way to describe empirical equivalence. Representing the world
mathematically involves formulating particular human intentions about how
that representation is supposed to work. We must take these considerations
into account when deciding whether or not two descriptions are empirically
equivalent.
The equivalence relation we use to say when two physical situations are
the same in general depends on what we would like a Lorentzian manifold
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to represent. Isometry is not “the only way”. For example, Lorentzian
manifolds have been used to describe the totality of knowledge that one can
in principle acquire. This thinking led Glymour (1972, 1977), Malament
(1977), and Manchak (2008) to an alternative standard of empirical equiv-
alence: two spacetimes (M,gab) and (M˜, g˜ab) are observationally equivalent
if and only if for each point p ∈M there exists a p˜ ∈ M˜ such that the back-
wards light cones I−(p) and I−(p˜) are related by an isometry. Of course,
this means that every pair of isometric spacetimes is also observationally
equivalent. But the converse is generally false: Manchak (2008) proved that
all but a few bizarre Lorentzian manifolds admit observationally equivalent
counterparts to which they are not isometric. This notion of empirical equiv-
alence, though weaker than that of an isometry, is an interesting standard of
equivalence for both philosophical and physical practice. It is an equivalence
relation determined by isometries between backward light cones. There is
nothing wrong with this because the choice equivalence of physical equiva-
lence relation is a matter of human convention, not a priori fact.
Another notion of equivalence arises when we take a Lorentzian manifold
to represent spacetime accurately only under certain circumstances, such as
when the interaction between gravitation and quantum fields can be ignored
with negligible error. In other words, we may have good reason to think
a representation is incomplete. Wigner believed that such incompleteness
is generic among laws of physics, writing that “laws of nature contain, in
even their remotest consequences, only a small part of our knowledge of the
inanimate world” (Wigner 1960, p.5). But this kind of incompleteness does
not prevent us from legitimately describing spacetime using a Lorentzian
manifold.
Such as in the case with the Lorentzian manifold representing black hole
evaporation, pictured in Figure 3 as a conformal diagram. As a Lorentzian
manifold (M,gab), this structure is almost universally understood to be in-
complete, and many competing accounts of what it represents have been
given. For example, many take the evolution of a quantum field over the
course of the black hole’s history to evolve unitarily according to the laws
of quantum theory, while others take that evolution to be non-unitary. This
practice proceeds with the understanding that isometry (and even identity!)
is not “the only way” to say whether two physical spacetimes are equiv-
alent, since Lorentzian manifolds represent spacetime incompletely. But
this should not dissuade anyone from the practice of representing spacetime
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Figure 3.
I−
I +
using a Lorentzian manifold. We must simply admit that two isometric
spacetimes — in this case, the very same spacetime — may sometimes be
used to represent different physical situations.
Even the hole argument itself was once used for the purposes of devel-
oping new physics in this way. Einstein himself discovered a version of the
argument while trying to formulate general relativity. There is no reason
to prohibit Einstein’s thinking, or to prohibit the more general practice of
exploring when two mathematical structures represent the same situation,
whether or not those structures are isomorphic. To do so would be overly re-
strictive, and perhaps even skirting the dreaded practice of a priori physics.
4. On warming up
Weatherall argues that his perspective on the hole argument can be mo-
tivated by a warm-up exercise. This exercise is susceptible to the same
problems as Weatherall’s main argument.
4.1. Weatherall’s integer exercise. In the exercise we consider two more
abstract structures, the groups of integers, (Z,+) and (Z, +˜). The binary
operation ‘+’ of the first group is normal arithmetic addition, so that 3 +
5 = 8, etc. The binary operation ‘+˜’ of the second group is arithmetic
addition followed by subtraction of 1, so that 3 +˜ 5 = 7, and in general
n +˜m = n+m− 1.
Weatherall asks whether there is an ambiguity with regard to which num-
ber is the identity in the group of integers. The identity element of the first
group (Z,+) is 0, since 0 + n = n+ 0 = 0 for all n ∈ Z. The identity of the
second group (Z, +˜) is 1, since 1+˜n = n+˜1 = n for all n ∈ Z. He concludes,
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quite correctly, that there is no ambiguity when ‘the identity’ is interpreted
as either the group identity or the set element 0. If ‘identity’ means ‘group
identity,’ then the term is only meaningful relative to a chosen group. So, 0
is the identity for (Z,+) and 1 is the identity for (Z, +˜). On the other hand,
if one means ‘the set element n’ where (say) n = 0, then again there is no
ambiguity in specifying this object. Thus, each concept of identity conferred
by the formalism provides an unambiguous way to represent the numbers.
All this is perfectly fine. But set theory and group theory are not the
only tools available for distinguishing numbers. One particularly relevant
alternative arises when one presumes a certain kind of realism about num-
bers known as a platonism. For the platonist, a number like (say) zero may
have a mind-independent existence, which provides the definitive criterion
for whether or not a given object n can serve as its representative. In other
words, the platonist uses mathematical reality, not group or set structure,
in order to determine whether two representations are equivalent.
I do not wish to advocate mathematical platonism. The point I am mak-
ing is that if one is a realist about some objects, then that realism may
provide an independent sense in which two such objects are or or not the
same. Just as I may take the letter S to denote the set of planets in the
universe that have no moons, so the realist about numbers can take the set
Z to denote the set objects in the mathematical universe that are integers.
For this kind of realist, there is a meaningful question about whether the
identity of the group (Z,+) or the identity of the group (Z, +˜) corresponds
to a given number 0 in the mind-independent set Z. Those of us that are
not platonists will find this question strange, but the point is that it is a
meaningful question to the realist, and it is the kind of question that comes
up when we use language to describe the real world. The fact that there is
no ambiguity about the group identity of each is irrelevant.
Let me point out an alternative argument using Weatherall’s example,
which I think better sets the stage for the hole argument7. It is an argument
against the plausibility of realism about the integers, which runs as follows.
(1) Suppose for reductio that the integers Z have a mind-independent
existence, and as a matter of mind-independent fact form a group
isomorphic to (Z,+), and with additive identity 0.
7This argument is akin to a classic argument of Benacerraf (1965), and related ones
discussed by (Kitcher 1984, Ch.6) and Shapiro (2000, Ch.10).
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(2) Define the groups of integers (Z,+) and (Z, +˜) as above, with addi-
tive identities 0 and 1, respectively.
(3) Observe that the group theoretic structure of these groups alone
does not determine which (if either) of 0 or 1 is the true identity.
Thus, realism about integers violates the principle (which someone
might call ‘Group Equivalence’8) that every group isomorphism re-
lates equivalent mathematical states of affairs.
(4) This failure may be too high a price to pay for a metaphysical view
about numbers. Thus, realism about integers is implausible.
This argument is a much closer analogue of the hole argument. Of course,
the final step here is questionable; I do not think the failure of ‘Group
Equivalence’ is a convincing refutation of realism about numbers. But the
analogous failure in the hole argument is much more dramatic, corresponding
to a radical failure of a certain kind of Laplacian determinism9.
4.2. Rotations of a vector. An alternative perspective can be gained with
some further warming up. Let me propose a similar exercise that makes use
of a more concrete structure, the rotations of the vector v shown in Figure
4.
v
Rθv
Figure 4.
We understand what it means to rotate this figure. No mathematics is
needed for that; we can just pick up the page and turn it. Call these the
physical rotations. These physical rotations may be expressed in mathemat-
ical language. For example, writing v ∈ R2 in Cartesian coordinates, we can
define a group of rotations using the set of matrices {Rθ : θ ∈ [0, 2π)} under
8As the name suggests, Group Equivalence is akin to Leibniz Equivalence in the dis-
cussion of the Hole Argument.
9Butterfield (1989) exhibits an interesting sense of determinism that still be saved.
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the operation of matrix multiplication, where,
Rθ =
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
.
Each matrix Rθ transforms a vector v to one that is rotated counterclockwise
through the angle θ. These matrices have the properties that RθRθ′ = Rθ+θ′ ,
and that the identity matrix is R0 = I, in that IRθ = RθI = Rθ for all Rθ.
The structure (Rθ, ·) forms a group, which provides one precise mathematical
representation of the physical rotations of the arrow.
However, there are many ways to instantiate a rotation group. Let me
define a new binary operation ‘∗’ on the same matrices by the relation
Rθ ∗Rθ′ := Rθ+θ′−pi.
The identity element for the new group (Rθ, ∗) is not the identity matrix,
but rather Rpi, since Rpi ∗Rθ = Rθ ∗Rpi = Rθ for all rotations Rθ.
There is an isomorphism from (Rθ, ∗) to (Rθ, ·) given by ρ(Rθ) = Rθ−pi.
We thus have two isomorphic groups defined on the same underlying set of
rotation matrices. Does this imply that both are equally correct ways to
describe the physical rotations of the vector v? Or that the matrices I and
Rpi are equally correct representatives of the identity rotation? Of course
not: the first description (with the standard identity element I) is correct
in a way that the second description is not. We can say why this is without
referring to any special mathematical objects: we began with an experience
of what it means to physically rotate the vector v, and our description in
terms of the second group fails to adequately capture that experience.
Weatherall’s dictum prohibits us from making any such judgement. The
two descriptions of the physical rotations are given by isomorphic mathe-
matical models, which therefore represent a given physical situation “equally
well, for all purposes”. Thus one must seemingly conclude that both descrip-
tions are equally good models of the physical rotations. This is a strange
conclusion to arrive at. When representing the world in terms of groups,
as with many mathematical structures, there may be reasons external to
the formalism that lead us to distinguish between isomorphic models. To
prohibit any such distinction would be an implausible restriction on how
mathematics is used.
One might be tempted to try to save Weatherall’s dictum by adding more
mathematical structure. For example, instead of describing the rotations of
the arrow using the group G = (Rθ, ·), one could describe them using a
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matrix representation, which is a pair (G, ρ) with ρ : G → GL a homomor-
phism from G into the ‘General Linear’ group GL of 2 × 2 matrices over
the real numbers. The first group G = (Rθ, ·) is made into a matrix rep-
resentation by introducing the mapping ι : Rθ 7→ Rθ. The second group
G∗ = (Rθ, ∗) is made into a matrix representation by introducing the map-
ping ρ : Rθ :7→ Rθ−pi. As matrix representations, the structures (G, ι) and
(G∗, ρ) are the same. They both take the group identity to the matrix iden-
tity I. They both take the order-2 group element to Rpi. Thus, on this
more elaborate description of rotations, we have just one representation of
the rotation group, and the previous difficulty does not arise.
I do not deny that a matrix representations provide one way to describe
physical rotations. But this does nothing to improve the plausibility of
Weatherall’s dictum. Our concern here is with the common-language use
of ‘representation’ as a model or description of a physical situation. This
should not be conflated with the mathematically precise concept of a matrix
representation. The groups G = (Rθ, ·) and G
∗ = (Rθ, ∗) each provide
a representation of the physical rotations in the common-language sense,
even though neither has been given enough structure to count as a matrix
representation.
This might lead one to observe that a matrix representation describes the
physical rotations in a more complete way than a mere group. Problems only
arise for Weatherall’s dictum because a group alone provides an incomplete
description of the physical rotations. But that is exactly the point. Factors
outside of a given mathematical formalism may distinguish between two
descriptions, even when the formalism itself does not. The point that I
would like to emphasise is that this is not a rare occurrence, but a very
common feature of mathematical modelling. One can avoid the trap by
reminding oneself that, contrary to what Weatherall suggests, it is Nature
that ultimately determines what is physically equivalent and what is not.
5. An alternative brand of quietism
There is gentler brand of quietism in the neighborhood of Weatherall’s
view that might be worth clarifying. It is an attitude that I myself adopt
from time to time, and provides some guidance on how to react to the
Hole Argument. The main difference is that this view will be presented as
a mere attitude, as opposed to a rule restricting the use of mathematical
representations. I know of no argument that establishes the present view.
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Some simply take comfort in the gentle, Buddhist-like perspective on the
philosophy of physics that this attitude provides.
The attitude begins by stating the propositions that we have good evi-
dence to believe, in the normal language of science10. For example, we may
all agree that the region near the galactic centre has the structure of Kerr
spacetime. But at this point, the attitude refuses all further interpretive
claims. Questions like ‘Is the manifold M is real?’ are passed over silently.
In their stead one adopts an attitude of quietism as far as the propositions
of realism about unobservables are concerned.
I take this to capture a sense of what Arthur Fine has called the Natural
Ontological Attitude (NOA), which he summarizes as the recommendation
to ‘try to take science on its own terms, and try not to read things into
science’ (Fine 1986, p.149). This perspective can be helpful, and indeed I
often find myself joining its practitioners in the monastery for a little peace
of mind. However, there is no use pretending that this view is established
by any rigorous argument or rule, as Fine is quick to point out:
It does not comprise a doctrine, nor does it set a philosophi-
cal agenda. At most it orients us somewhat on how to pursue
problems of interest, promoting some issues relative to oth-
ers just because they more clearly connect with science itself.
Such a redirection is exactly what we want and expect from
an attitude, which is all that NOA advertises itself as being.
(Fine 1986, p.10).
The NOA attitude toward manifold substantivalism, I take it, is an exercise
in the discipline of silence.
However, the hole argument is not necessarily a case where this attitude
is appropriate. The argument itself identifies an interesting connection be-
tween the realism debate and philosophy of science, in establishing a link
between manifold substantivalism and indeterminism. It has also promoted
interesting connections between the realism debate and modern physics in
helping to motivate a relationist perspective on spacetime in quantum grav-
ity (Isham 1993; Belot and Earman 1999; Rovelli 2004) as well as sophis-
ticated substantivalist alternatives (Pooley 2006). Clearly, with too much
quietism you may miss out on some of the fun. But a healthy dose of the
kind of quietism I have described here may still help orient one toward the
more fruitful problems in the philosophy of physics.
10This is what Ruetsche (2011, §1) refers to as a partial interpretation of a theory.
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6. Conclusion
Formal equivalence relations are only meaningful once a standard of equiv-
alence has been identified. But it would be a mistake to suggest that the
only acceptable equivalence relations are those “given” by the formalism of
a physical theory. The hole argument has not been ‘blocked’ by Weather-
all’s discussion, and previous commentators have not failed to ‘recognize
the mathematical significance of an isomorphism’(Weatherall forthcoming,
p.13 fn.20). It simply concerns matters of realism that are precluded from
Weatherall’s discussion by fiat. The danger in such a radical restriction on
mathematical representation is that it forgoes the practice of using math-
ematical representations that are incomplete. Earman and Norton (1987)
argued that as a metaphysical doctrine, manifold substantivalism may come
at too high a price. The price of Weatherall’s dictum for applied mathemat-
ics may be at least as high.
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